Accommodation of Occupation and Social Utility In Prior Public Use Jurisprudence by Arena, Mark S.
COMMENTS
THE ACCOMMODATION OF "OCCUPATION" AND
"SOCIAL UTILITY" IN PRIOR PUBLIC USE
JURISPRUDENCE
MARK S. ARENAt
INTRODUCTION
The city of New Haven owns an airport located partially within
the city and partially within the town of East Haven. East Haven is
hostile to the development of the airport and for years has sought to
contain it. East Haven and the East Haven Economic Development
Commission institute eminent domain proceedings to take three parcels
of the airport's land, situated in East Haven but owned by New Ha-
ven, to develop an industrial park. The parcels are not currently used
for airport operations except to the extent that they ensure requisite
unobstructed air space and permit future expansion of airport facilities.
The industrial park could be an important source of economic develop-
ment for the town. East Haven seeks to take the parcels subject to any
height restrictions imposed by federal and state statutes and regulations.
In response, the city of New Haven and the board of airport commis-
sioners bring actions to enjoin East Haven from taking the three par-
cels. New Haven's central argument is that the property cannot be con-
demned because it is already devoted to public use.'
The prior public use doctrine is a judicial rule employed in the
adjudication of such conflicts, in which a condemnor endowed with a
general grant of the power of eminent domain attempts to use the
power to take property already dedicated to a public use. The problem
often arises in disputes between corporations granted equal powers of
t B.A. 1979, Ursinus College; M.A. 1981, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Can-
didate 1989, University of Pennsylvania.
I The facts are drawn from City of New Haven v. Town of E. Haven, 35 Conn.
Supp. 157, 402 A.2d 345 (1977), affd, 177 Conn. 749, 419 A.2d 349 (1979); see also
infra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing City of New Haven).
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eminent domain by the state.2 The state may delegate this power to
political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities.3 In addition,
despite the prevailing conception of eminent domain as a governmental
attribute, the state may also delegate the power to private corporations
furnishing public services, such as utility companies and railroads.4
The various political subdivisions enjoy equal stature "within their
proper spheres." 5 Moreover, these subdivisions, as public corporations,
are generally considered to be of equal stature to private corporations
endowed with the same power of eminent domain.' Although the state
may authorize the taking of land devoted to one public use for a differ-
ent public use, statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to pub-
lic and private corporations often fail to address the question whether
or not the entity may condemn property already dedicated to public
use.7 This situation has spawned the prior public use doctrine.
The rule may be set forth briefly, for the articulation of its essen-
tial elements varies little from one jurisdiction to another, and courts
often recite as well-settled the standard renditions propounded in the
treatises. For example:
"[When a] condemnor to whom the power of eminent do-
main has been delegated, such as a municipality or a private
corporation, seeks to exercise the power with respect to prop-
erty already devoted to public use, the general rule is that
where the proposed use will either destroy such existing use
or interfere with it to such an extent as is tantamount to
destruction, the exercise of the power will be denied unless
the legislature has authorized the acquisition either expressly
or by necessary implication. '
2 See infra notes 5-16 and accompanying text.
3 See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROP-
ERTY 510 (1984) [hereinafter R. CUNNINGHAM]; Dau, Problems in Condemnation of
Property Devoted to Public Use, 44 TEx. L. REv. 1517, 1520 (1966).
See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 3, at 510; Dau, supra note 3, at 1520.
5 Dau, supra note 3, at 1520.
8 See id.
7 See id. at 1521.
8 Greater Clark County School Corp. v. Public Serv. Co., 179 Ind. App. 331, 333,
385 N.E.2d 952, 954 (1979) (quoting 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 2.2, at 2-57 to 2-58 (rev. 3d ed. 1973)). Another very similar, frequently encountered
version reads:
The general rule . . . is that "... property already devoted to a public
use cannot be taken for another public use which will totally destroy or
materially impair or interfere with the former use, unless the intention of
the legislature that it should be so taken has been manifested in express
terms or by necessary implication, mere general authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain being in such case insufficient; . .. .
[Vol. 137:233
PRIOR PUBLIC USE JURISPRUDENCE
The doctrine has been invoked to resolve such conflicts as a city's at-
tempt to condemn, for erection of a water tower, the land of a cemetery
association;9 a town's attempt to condemn, for development of an indus-
trial park, airport property owned by a city;1" a city's attempt to con-
demn, for airport operation, easement rights in the airspace of property
owned by a railroad;"1 a state highway commission's attempt to con-
demn township park property;12 a township's attempt to condemn, for
recreational and parking facilities, land owned by a railroad;13 a city's
attempt to condemn, for construction of an airport, the public street of a
village;"' a city's attempt to condemn and take over the operation of a
public utility's electrical facilities; 5 and a city's attempt to condemn the
land of a charitable hospital in order to widen a street."
Although courts have concurred in their characterization of the
prior public use doctrine, they have diverged in their interpretation and
application of the rule. The rule raises a number of questions: What is
"use"? What is "public use"? When are uses "compatible"? What con-
Tuomey Hosp. v. City of Sumter, 243 S.C. 544, 549, 134 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1964)
(quoting 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 74, at 861). For additional statements of the
rule, see, e.g., Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, 126 Colo. 267, 273, 248 P.2d
732, 735 (1952) (en banc); City of New Haven v. Town of E. Haven, 35 Conn. Supp.
157, 164, 402 A.2d 345, 349 (1977), affid, 177 Conn. 749, 419 A.2d 349 (1979); City
of Wilmington v. Lord, 340 A.2d 182, 184 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); Florida E. Coast
Ry. v. Broward County, 421 So. 2d 681, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Michigan
State Highway Comm'n v. St. Joseph Township, 48 Mich. App. 230, 238-39, 210
N.W.2d 251, 255-56 (1973); Kansas City v. Ashley, 406 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Mo. 1966);
Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 579, 120 A.2d 593, 596 (1956);
E & J Holding Corp. v. Noto, 126 A.D.2d 641, 642, 510 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901 (1987);
Southern Ry. v. City of Greensboro, 247 N.C. 321, 329, 101 S.E.2d 347, 355 (1957);
Yadkin County v. City of High Point, 217 N.C. 462, 465, 8 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1940);
Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St. 345, 351, 182 N.E.2d 557, 561-
62 (1962); Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Comm'rs, 112 Ohio App.
272, 280, 166 N.E.2d 143, 150 (1960), appeal dismissed per curiam, 171 Ohio St.
449, 172 N.E.2d 133 (1961); City of Brook Park v. Columbia Rd. Inv., Inc., 23 Ohio
Misc. 363, 365-66, 256 N.E.2d 284, 286 (P. Ct. 1970); City of Pryor Creek v. Public
Serv. Co., 536 P.2d 343, 346 (Okla. 1975); President and Fellows of Middlebury Col-
lege v. Central Power Corp., 101 Vt. 325, 336, 143 A. 384, 388 (1928); Vermont
Hydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 149, 112 A. 223, 225 (1921); 2A C. ANTIEAU,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 20.01 (D. Epstein rev. ed. 1984); Ball, Intergov-
ernmental Conflicts in Land Acquisition: Adjustment for Maximum Public Benefit,
10 OHIO ST. L.J. 30, 33-34 (1949); Dau, supra note 3, at 1521.
1 See Beth Medrosh Hagodol, 126 Colo. at 267, 248 P.2d at 732.
10 See City of New Haven, 35 Conn. Supp. at 157, 402 A.2d at 345.
" See Florida E. Coast Ry., 421 So. 2d at 681.
12 See Michigan State Highway Comm'n, 48 Mich. App. at 230, 210 N.W.2d at
251.
13 See Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 120 A.2d 593 (1956).
14 See Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St. 345, 182 N.E.2d
557 (1962).
15 See City of Pryor Creek v. Public Serv. Co., 536 P.2d 343 (Okla. 1975).
See Tuomey Hosp. v. City of Sumter, 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E.2d 744 (1964).
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stitutes "necessary implication"? What is the appropriate judicial role
contemplated by the doctrine? Courts have not always resolved these
issues consistently.
17
Part I of this Comment analyzes the variations in judicial inter-
pretation and application of the prior public use doctrine. In so doing,
it demonstrates the following theses:
1. Courts usually recite the rule mechanically, without analyzing
its purpose, and, when they do offer reasons for it, they perfunctorily
describe it as a means of implementing legislative intent or averting
circular condemnations.
2. Courts consistently construe the term "use," in the phrase
"property already devoted to public use," liberally enough to encom-
pass not only current use, but also reasonably anticipated future use, so
long as the expectation of use is not merely an indefinite, "naked"
possibility.
3. Courts have revealed a tension, in construing the term "public
use," between a) a bright line rule that formalistically requires the re-
sisting owner to possess a power of condemnation equivalent to that of
the condemnor and b) a more flexible, case-by-case approach.
4. The "compatible use" theory permits a taking if the proposed
and pre-existing uses may exist together, even if the pre-existing user
may suffer some inconvenience.
5. Authorities conflict over the degree of necessity required by the
words "unless the legislature has authorized the acquisition by neces-
sary implication." Some authorities look for a necessity so absolute that
a denial of the acquisition would defeat the grant of power; other au-
thorities consider factors of practicality and economy and look only for
reasonable necessity.
6. Some courts embrace a "more necessary use" test, weighing the
benefits to the public of the competing uses, while other courts refuse to
engage in the weighing process. Among the former courts, the test has
assumed a variety of forms, such as a) an exception to the prior public
use rule; b) a narrowly drawn embodiment of the exception, requiring
that the necessity be so great as to make the new enterprise of para-
mount importance to the public and that the enterprise cannot be ac-
complished practically in any other way; and c) an application of broad
"more necessary use" statutory provisions.
7. Some courts attribute great significance to the "character" of
condemnor and condemnee, such that a) a municipal corporation may
condemn the facilities of a public service corporatibn to take over their
"7 See infra notes 26-105 and accompanying text.
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operation or b) the protection of the prior public use doctrine is inoper-
ative when an agent of the state seeks to condemn land devoted to pub-
lic use. Other courts, however, do not discriminate in this manner when
applying the doctrine.
Part II of the Comment suggests a prior public use jurisprudence
that reconciles the divergent applications of the doctrine. Drawing on
two theories frequently advanced to justify property ownership, it ar-
gues that the best rationale for the doctrine is its potential for accom-
modating both the "occupation" and "social utility" dimensions of
property. The appropriate judicial role contemplated by the doctrine
derives from courts' ability, and duty, to be responsive to both dimen-
sions of property in prior public use adjudication. The principle of ju-
dicial protection of possession or occupation, tempered by judicial
mindfulness that it is desirable to use property in the most socially val-
uable way, points to a solution of the conflicts engendered by the "nec-
essary implication" clause and the various incarnations of the "more
necessary use" test. Furthermore, this principle furnishes guidance to
the courts in construction of the term "public use" and indicates the
degree of significance courts should attribute to the "character" of the
condemnor and the condemnee.
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE
DOCTRINE
A. Reasons for the Rule
An unfortunate feature of the prior public use doctrine is that it
has assumed a talismanic stature that precludes many courts from in-
quiring into its policy justifications. The rule is invoked with enough
metronomic uniformity to vindicate the comment that "even the most
devoted rule-fetishist would like to have a glimmer as to the reasons we
have the rules we have." '18 When courts have paused to reflect on the
reasons for the prior public use doctrine, their reflections have been
perfunctory, so that the cases advance the same rationales with a regu-
larity matching that of the repetition of the rule itself.
One explanation views the doctrine as a means of effectuating leg-
islative intent: the sovereign, in delegating the power of eminent do-
main to municipal or private corporations, could not intend that the
public use of one be subject to destruction, through condemnation, by
the public use of another, because both uses have been authorized by
18 B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONsTrrTION 8 (1977).
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the sovereign. 9 As one court stated:
"[I]t could not be intended that the state, having authorized
one taking, whereby the lands became impressed under au-
thority of the sovereign with a public use, meant to nullify
its own grant by authority to another corporation to take
them again for another public use, unless it so specifically
decreed ... . 2o
As Part II of this Comment shows, this argument ignores both the limi-
tations of the legislative process and the context in which clashes be-
tween public uses arise.2
A second explanation-by far the most frequently encoun-
tered-conceives of the doctrine as a means to avert circular, recrimina-
tory, or serial condemnations. Many corporations, both private and
municipal, are endowed with general powers of condemnation. Thus,
the argument goes, if one may condemn the land of another under such
a general power, then the latter "would logically be free to reacquire
the same property" from the former.22 One court noted that, absent a
9 See Hiland v. Ives, 154 Conn. 683, 689-90, 228 A.2d 502, 505 (1967).
'0 Board of Educ. v. Pace College, 27 A.D.2d 87, 89, 276 N.Y.S.2d 162, 165
(1966) (quoting In re New York, L. & W. R.R., 99 N.Y. 12, 23, 1 N.E. 27, 32
(1885)), motion denied, 19 N.Y.2d 672, 225 N.E.2d 554, 278 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1967); see
also Note, The Sovereign's Duty to Compensate for the Appropriation of Public Prop-
erty, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1086 (1967) ("The doctrine presumes that the legisla-
ture does not intend to terminate other public uses of property when it delegates a
general power to take.").
2 See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 579, 120 A.2d 593, 596
(1956); see also Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. Denver & R.G. R.R., 30 Colo. 204,
212, 69 P. 568, 571 (1902) ("[T]here would be no reasonable limit to the conditions
under which the power of eminent domain might be exercised."); Florida E. Coast Ry.
v. City of Miami, 321 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. 1975) (quoting Weehawken); Greater
Clark County School Corp. v. Public Serv. Co., 179 Ind. App. 331, 333-34, 385
N.E.2d 952, 954 (1979) ("[Albsent the prior public use rule, the land could be con-
demned back and forth indefinitely."); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Houma, 229 So. 2d 202, 206 (La. Ct. App.) ("[I]f under such authority the first taking
would be justified, its retaking would be equally within the power of the adverse
party."), cert. denied, 254 La. 1165, 229 So. 2d 350 (1969); City of Shakopee v. Clark,
295 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 1980) ("Prevention of this type of spectacle of two enti-
ties granted the right of eminent domain condemning each other's land is perhaps the
primary reason for the prior public use doctrine."); County of Bergen v. Erie Lack-
awanna R.R., 81 N.J. Super. 344, 348, 195 A.2d 511, 513 (Law Div. 1963) ("[A]
wasteful circuitry of litigation would result . . . ."), aff'd sub nom., Joint Meeting
No.1 v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 43 N.J. 281, 204 A.2d 129 (1964); Matteoni, The
California Roadway-'"A More Necessary Public Use", 20 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 553
(1969) (describing the prior public use doctrine as "a limitation developed by the judi-
ciary to prevent arbitrary or retaliatory acquisitions by authorized condemning agencies
against one another"); Case Comment, Prior Public Use Doctrine: New Judicial Crite-
ria-Florida East Coast Ry. v. City of Miami, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 505, 505-06
(1977) [hereinafter NewJudicial Criteria] (stating that the doctrine "prevents the per-
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deterrent such as the prior public use doctrine, "[t]he logical implica-
tion would be that there is no secure or permanent dedication to any
public use."2 Another court envisioned a parade of horrors in which
"'the city might condemn the court house square for an engine house,
the school district might condemn the engine house for a school house,
the county might condemn the school house for a court house, and an
endless chain of condemnations. . . might be set in operation.' "24 Al-
though these concerns are no doubt valid, their rote repetition, com-
bined with the reductio ad absurdum, has rendered them somewhat in-
substantial; theoretically logical implications are of little use to courts
presented with real clashes between public uses. Moreover, as Part II
of this Comment argues, the threat of circular condemnations is easily
dispelled.
2 5
B. The Nature of "Use"
The question of what constitutes "use" arises because the rule
protects from condemnation only property that is "already devoted to
public use." Consequently, a condemnor may try to demonstrate that
the disputed land is not being used. Courts have defined the criteria for
"use" consistently, often drawing on the language of Vermont Hydro-
Electric Corp. v. Dunn.28 In that case, the Vermont Supreme Court
liberally construed the term "use" to encompass not only current use,
but also reasonably anticipated future use: "[I]t is not necessary that
the property be actually in use for the public purpose to exempt it from
the proceeding." '27 The court took pains, however, to limit its liberal
construction of "use" by imposing a reasonableness test. The rule
would not exempt property "held for future use upon the mere possi-
bility that it may at some future time become necessary . . . . Reason-
able expectation of future needs is required . . . . Nor is the exemp-
tion indefinite in point of time, but the property must be subjected to
. . . use. . . within a reasonable time." 28 As the New Jersey Supreme
Court has put it, the doctrine "applies to land held by a corporation to
accommodate reasonably foreseeable future demands, . . . although a
petuation of condemnation proceedings").
23 Cemetery Co. v. Warren School Township, 236 Ind. 171, 185, 139 N.E.2d
538, 544-45 (1957).
2' Medical Center Comm'n v. Powell, 124 Ill. App. 2d 123, 131, 260 N.E.2d 261,
265 (1970) (quoting City of Edwardsville v. County of Madison, 251 Ill. 265, 267, 96
N.E. 238, 238 (1911)).
25 See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
28 95 Vt. 144, 112 A. 223 (1921).
2'7 Id. at 149, 112 A. at 226.
28 Id. at 150, 112 A. at 226 (citations omitted).
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mere naked possibility that it will be so used will not immunize it
")29
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the foregoing principles
precluded a township from bringing its "park land" within the ambit
of the rule when the property had not been used by the public in the
eight years since its dedication to park purposes, no public money had
been appropriated for the "park", the township could not demonstrate
a need for the particular land at issue instead of the land offered by the
condemnor in exchange, and there was only a possibility that the land
would be used by the public in the future.30 Similarly, the "mere laying
of rails" by a railroad company across a right of way that had been
held idle by several railroad companies for approximately sixteen years
did not manifest a "bona fide intention" to devote the way to railroad
use-especially considering that the action was taken shortly before the
commencement of condemnation proceedings by a power company,
which wanted the land for a reservoir site. 1 On the other hand, when a
town sought to condemn parcels of airport land owned by a neighbor-
ing city, but located within the town, the land was insulated from con-
demnation by the Connecticut Superior Court, even though it was not
being used for actual airport operations at the time, because "it is rea-
sonable to conclude that there will be an increase in the demand for the
services of the airport . . . .These increases . . . will require the ex-
pansion of the airport facilities. Accordingly, it is anticipated that the
2 Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 583, 120 A.2d 593, 598
(1956) (citations omitted); see also East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. City of Lodi, 120 Cal.
App. 740, 754, 8 P.2d 532, 537 (1932) ("[T]here must be a liberal consideration of the
future,. . . but the mere possibility that the land. . . may at some future time become
necessary" is not sufficient.); Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. Denver & R.G. R.R.,
30 Colo. 204, 218, 69 P. 568, 572 (1902) (The condemned lands "must, within a
reasonable time, be subjected to the use for which they were granted."); City of New
Haven v. Town of E. Haven, 35 Conn. Supp. 157, 169, 402 A.2d 345, 352 (1977)
("The test must be whether there is a reasonable assurance that the intended use will
come to pass."), affd, 177 Conn. 749, 419 A.2d 349 (1979); Dau, supra note 3, at
1517 ("[Wlhile it is not necessary for the property to be actually in use for the public
purpose, the intent to place the property into this use without unreasonable delay must
be present."); Matteoni, supra note 22, at 561 ("Property acquired by a condemnor for
public use and held in reasonable anticipation of future needs with a bona fide inten-
tion of using it for such public purpose within a reasonable time is 'appropriated to' a
public purpose.").
30 See Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. St. Joseph Township, 48 Mich. App.
230, 240, 210 N.W.2d 251, 256 (1973).
31 See Denver Power, 30 Colo. at 218-19, 69 P. at 573; cf. County of Bergen v.
Erie Lackawanna R.R., 81 N.J. Super. 344, 348, 195 A.2d 511, 513 (Law Div. 1963)
(stating that the mere filing of a condemnation complaint does not devote the land
sought to public use), affid sub nom., Joint Meeting No.1 v. Erie Lackawanna R.R.,
43 N.J. 281, 204 A.2d 129 (1964).
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land . . .will be used . . .within the reasonably foreseeable future
"32
C. The Nature of "Public Use"
"Use" alone does not trigger the prior public use doctrine; the use
must qualify as a "public use." To determine whether a given uise
qualifies as a public use, courts have struggled with conflicting im-
pulses: on the one hand, there is the safety of'a bright-line rule; on the
other hand, some cases lend themselves to a more flexible, case-by-case
approach. The language of Vermont Hydro-Electric has again struck a
chord that has resonated over the years, expressing the rule as follows:
[A] mere voluntary assumption of public service which may
be abandoned at any time does not carry with it the privilege
of exemption. The test whether land is held for a public use
such as will exempt it from condemnation is said not to be
what the owner does or may choose to do but what under the
law he must do, and whether a public trust is impressed
upon it.
33
This type of "test" appears in a host of opinions from courts of other
states. 4 Some courts have applied it with relentless rigor. For example,
the Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that when a water company
had not reached "the point where [it was] under a present legal obliga-
tion to maintain a public purpose," it "simply had not done enough to
" City of New Haven, 35 Conn. Supp. at 169, 402 A.2d at 352 (footnotes
omitted).
11 Vermont Hydro-Elec., 95 Vt. at 149, 112 A. at 226.
See, e.g., City of New Haven, 35 Conn. Supp. at 165, 402 A.2d at 350 ("The
test ... is not how the use is furnished but rather the right of the public to receive and
enjoy its benefit."); President & Fellows of Middlebury College v. Central Power
Corp., 101 Vt. 325, 337, 143 A. 384, 388 (1928) ("It is essential to a public use, as the
term is used in proceedings involving the law of condemnation or eminent domain, that
the public must, to some extent, be entitled to use or enjoy the property, not by favor,
but as a matter of right."); Bailey v. Anderson, 182 Va. 70, 74, 27 S.E.2d 914, 916
(" 'The test of whether or not property has been devoted to public use is what the
owner must do, not what he may choose to do.'" (quoting 18 AM. JUR. Eminent Do-
main § 94, at 720)), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 799 (1943); 1 P. NiCHOLS, supra note 8,
§ 2.2[51, at 2-86 ("If [the owner of land] has devoted it to a public use which he is
under a legal obligation to maintain, it falls within the protection of the rule. On the
other hand, a mere voluntary assumption of public service which may be abandoned at
any time carries with it no such privilege."). But see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Houma, 229 So. 2d 202, 210 (La. Ct. App.) ("That [the public] use may be
discontinued at any time is a matter of no moment."), cert. denied, 254 La. 1165, 229
So. 2d 350 (1969); McCarter, The Case That Almost Was, 54 A.B.A. J. 1076, 1078
(1968) (claiming that the standard set forth in Vermont Hydro-Electric does not "bear
scrutiny").
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become a protected entity."3 5 The Supreme Court of Maine found that,
although the activities of an agricultural society conferred some benefit
upon the public, they "fell short of constituting 'public uses' in the
technical sense": the society was a private, voluntary corporation, not a
political subdivision of the state; it could be dissolved at any time; and
its members were under no legal obligation to perpetuate the activities
benefitting the public."'
In other cases, however, even as the courts pay lip service to the
bright-line rule, they strive to loosen its constraints, often under the
guise of liberal construction. For example, in Tuomey Hospital v. City
of Sumter,37 in which the city sought to condemn land owned by an
eleemosynary corporation operating a charitable hospital, the court en-
dorsed the conventional dogma that "mere benefit" to the public does
not constitute a public use; the public must have an "enforceable right
to a definite and fixed use of the property."38 The court also acknowl-
edged, however, the difficulty of comprehensively defining the term
"public use," because the public-private distinction "lies in the charac-
ter of the use and must to a large extent depend upon the facts of each
case."39 The court concluded:
While the question of whether the complaint alleges a
public use of the property involved is a close one, we think
that under a liberal construction thereof, the question of
public use is a factual issue which must be resolved, in the
light of the foregoing principles, under the facts as developed
upon the trial of the case.4"
35 City of Blue Springs v. Central Dev. Ass'n, 684 S.W.2d 44, 50 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984).
s1 Oxford County Agricultural Soc'y v. School Admin. Dist. No. 17, 161 Me. 334,
335-36, 211 A.2d 893, 894 (1965).
-, 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E.2d 744 (1964).
SB Id. at 551, 134 S.E.2d at 747 ("Mere benefit to the public or permission by the
owner for use of property by the public are not enough to constitute a public use, but it
must appear that the public has an enforceable right to a definite and fixed use of the
property." (citing 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 31; 18 AM. JuR. Eminent Domain
§ 94, at 720)).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 552, 134 S.E.2d at 748; see also City of New Haven, 35 Conn. Supp. at
165, 402 A.2d at 350 ("'A public use defies absolute definition, for it changes with
varying conditions of society . . . . Courts as a general rule, instead of attempting
judicially to define a public as distinguished from a private purpose, have left each case
to be determined on its peculiar circumstances. . . . The modern trend of authority is
to expand and liberally construe the meaning of "public purpose."' " (quoting Barnes
v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 15, 98 A.2d 523, 527 (1953))), affd, 177 Conn.
749, 419 A.2d 349 (1979); President & Fellows of Middlebury College v. Central
Power Corp., 101 Vt. 325, 336, 143 A. 384, 388 (1928) (The private-public use dis-
tinction "cannot be made upon consideration of legal principles alone; economic condi-
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Another approach to the meaning of "public use" is to look not for
a legal obligation on the owner's part, but rather, even more formalisti-
cally, at the mere status or nature of the owner. In one example, a city
sought to condemn a water system located within an area of a township
that had been annexed by the city.41 The Kansas Supreme Court rea-
soned that the township had lost its legal authority to serve the public
and that its property had been metamorphosed into private property
held in a proprietary capacity. Therefore, the court concluded in a tri-
umphant rhetorical question, "What now becomes of the argument that
the township water system . . . is 'devoted to public use'? . . . [O]ne
public utility may condemn the property of another public utility if the
last company is not using its property to serve the public."42 And in
Board of Education v. Pace College,43 the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, held that a private institution of higher learning
could not invoke the prior public use doctrine to resist a local school
board's condemnation of its land, because the college did not possess a
power to condemn equivalent to that of the condemnor."" Its analysis of
the case law convinced the court that:
Not one of the cited decisions contains the slightest sugges-
tion that the law protects from condemnation for public pur-
poses lands other than those "actually held by authority of
the sovereign power for or necessary to some public purpose
or use ....
S. .[WMe are persuaded that it is no defense to plain-
tiff's petition that Pace College performs an admittedly use-
ful service to the community and one in which the public has
such vital interest that the State undertakes to regulate and
control closely those institutions which engage therein.4
In so ruling, the court reversed a decision below that had denied the
susceptibility of "public use" to precise definition and had embarked on
tions and the needs of the people must have attention.").
41 See State ex rel. Foster v. City of Kansas City, 187 Kan. 286, 356 P.2d 859
(1960).
42 Id. at 289-90, 356 P.2d at 861.
43 27 A.D.2d 87, 276 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1966), motion denied, 19 N.Y.2d 672, 225
N.E.2d 554, 278 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1967).
44 See id. at 89, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
45 Id. at 90-91, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 165-66 (quoting In re Rochester Water
Comm'rs, 66 N.Y. 413, 418 (1876)); see also Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife
Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 268, 225 A.2d 130, 134 (1966) ("[Defendant] has no...
power to acquire [its] lands . . . by condemnation .... Under these circumstances,
we are satisfied that [it] is not qualified under the prior public use doctrine .... ").
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an ad hoc examination of Pace College's nexus with the state educa-
tional system." The lower court had also noted that Pace College had
the power to condemn real property for its water works and sewer sys-
tem, thereby clothing such property in the public use garb. The court
wryly pointed out the incongruity of a rule of law that would insulate
from condemnation property "devoted to the purely service and inci-
dental functions of water supply and sewerage disposal" while "render-
ing vulnerable . . . the property and facilities devoted to its primary
function, i.e., higher education." '47
The prior public use jurisprudence proposed in Part II of this
Comment stresses an accommodation of both the "occupation" and "so-
cial utility" dimensions of property. This Comment rejects bright-line
formalism and embraces the more flexible, case-by-case approach. The
rigid requirement that the condemnee be legally obligated to maintain a
public purpose begs the essential question of what constitutes a public
purpose. Neither this requirement nor the requirement that the re-
sisting owner possess a power of eminent domain like that of the con-
demnor advances the twin goals of "occupation" and "social utility. "48
D. The "Compatible Use" Theory
A further question arising under the prior public use doctrine de-
rives from the requirement that the proposed use either destroy or ma-
terially impair the pre-existing use. This requirement has spawned an
exception to the rule known as the "compatible use theory." Under the
compatible use theory, the taking is permitted if the proposed use "will
not materially impair or interfere with or is not inconsistent with the
use already existing . . . 2 9 This exception has been characterized as
48 See Board of Educ. v. Pace College, 50 Misc. 2d 806, 807-08, 271 N.Y.S.2d
773, 775-77 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 27 A.D.2d 87, 276 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1966), motion denied,
19 N.Y.2d 672, 225 N.E.2d 554, 278 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1967).
47 Id. at 810, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
48 Cf infra notes 170-86 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of
the character of the condemnor and condemnee).
41 Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. State Rd. Dep't, 176 So. 2d 111, 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965); see also Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Broward County, 421 So. 2d 681, 683
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("[W]hen a taking will not materially impair or interfere
with or is not inconsistent with the existing use, and the proposed use is not detrimental
to the public, then a court possesses authority to order a taking of the property.");
Harrison County School Bd. v. State Highway Comm'n, 284 So. 2d 50, 53 (Miss.
1973) (permitting "one superior governmental body to condemn property of some other
inferior governmental body if the taking will not materially impair the existing uses
and is not detrimental to the public interest"); Village of Amityville v. Suffolk County,
132 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) ("[W]here the new use is not inconsistent
with the old use, one municipality may condemn the land of another municipality.");
D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A
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one of the means by which a court can circumvent the potentially ex-
cessive inhibitory effect of the rule-its "frightening inflexibil-
ity" 5 0-while preserving the rule's policy justification "that an impor-
tant public use should be protected."'" Under the exception, it is no bar
to condemnation that the pre-existing use may suffer some inconve-
nience, so long as the two uses may stand together. 2 The determination
whether the two uses may stand together is to be made not "with refer-
ence to every possible manner in which the land might be used for the
purpose for which it had been acquired, but with a reasonable regard
to the way in which it would naturally and reasonably be used in put-
ting it to that purpose."" The compatible use theory has permitted a
state road department to widen a road by condemning portions of a
railroad company's right of way used for drainage," a state highway
commission to condemn for construction of an interstate highway part
of a school board's land used for recreational purposes,"5 a county to
condemn a right of way for a highway through a village's parking
field, 6 a town to lay out a street over land in which a city had laid its
water pipes," and a gas and electric corporation to take an easement
for placement of poles carrying overhead lines and conduits carrying
FEDERAL SYSTEM 161 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter D. MANDELKER] ("[D]octrine per-
mits intergovernmental condemnation when the proposed use would not interfere with
or be inconsistent with the public use to which the property is presently devoted."); 11
E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.72 at 413 (3d ed.
1983) ("[If the taking does not impair or interfere with the public use and is not
inconsistent therewith, the property may be condemned."); Ball, supra note 8, at 35
("If the court finds the uses consistent, taking will be allowed under general authority
to the extent necessary to accommodate both uses."); Dau, supra note 3, at 1524 (when
a new use can be carried on without materially impairing an established use, prior
public use doctrine is inapplicable); Phay, The Municipal Corporation and Conflicts
Over Extraterritorial Acquisitions: The Need for Land Planning, 17 VAND. L. REv.
347, 352 (1964) ("[Clourts have. . . permitted a condemnation of publicly used prop-
erty if the taking is consistent with the property and will not interfere with the present
public use."); NewJudicial Criteria, supra note 22, at 509 (recognizing a "compatible
use" exception to prior public use doctrine).
50 Phay, supra note 49, at 367.
51 New Judicial Criteria, supra note 22, at 509.
5 See State v. T.O.L., Inc., 206 So. 2d 69, 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
53 City of Boston v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 156 Mass. 172, 176, 30 N.E. 611,
611 (1892) (citing Inhabitants of Springfield v. Connecticut River R.R., 58 Mass. (4
Cush.) 63 (1849)); see also 11 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 49, § 32.68 (using virtually
identical language to state the same standard).
See Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. State Rd. Dep't, 176 So. 2d 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965).
" See Harrison County School Bd. v. State Highway Comm'n, 284 So. 2d 50
(Miss. 1973).
"' See Village of Amityville v. Suffolk County, 132 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1954).
11 See City of Boston, 156 Mass. at 172, 30 N.E. at 611.
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underground lines in property owned by a railroad company. 58
E. The "Necessary Implication" Clause and
the "More Necessary Use" Test
1. The Necessary Implication Clause
A wrinkle in the prior public use doctrine that has engendered
more widely disparate results is the "necessary implication" clause.
This clause allows the taking of property devoted to public use if the
legislature has authorized the taking by necessary implication.59 As one
commentator has pointed out, authorities conflict over the degree of ne-
cessity needed to create the implication: some cases require the necessity
to be so absolute that "the denial thereof would defeat the grant of the
power," while other cases "hold that the factors of practicability and
economy may be considered and that a reasonable necessity. . . will be
sufficient to justify the exercise of the power." 0 The former stance was
"8 See Long Island R.R. v. Long Island Lighting Co., 103 A.D.2d 156, 165-66,
479 N.Y.S.2d 355, 362 (1984) ("LILCO is seeking to appropriate a limited interest in
the property for a use not inconsistent with the use thereof by the railroad and it has
successfully fashioned its taking so that the proposed condemnation comes within an
exception to the ... prior public use doctrine."), affid, 64 N.Y.2d 1088, 479 N.E.2d
226, 489 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1985).
"' That same clause also allows the taking if the legislature has expressly author-
ized it. Express authorization is not litigated often, but for cases addressing the issue,
see, e.g., City of E. Peoria v. Group Five Dev. Co., 87 Ill. 2d 42, 46, 429 N.E.2d 492,
494 (1981) ("In light of the amendments allowing just compensation for the taking of
public property, it seems clear that the legislature intended to provide for the condem-
nation of property already devoted to a public use."); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Houma, 229 So. 2d 202, 207 (La. Ct. App.) ("[F]or such authority to be ex-
pressly conferred, the statute must employ or include either the term 'public property'
or some clear equivalent thereof."), cert. denied, 254 La. 1165, 229 So. 2d 350 (1969);
cf. City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 194 Colo. 526, 537, 575
P.2d 382, 391 (1978) (en banc) (The Colorado constitution "grants to home rule mu-
nicipalities ample power to acquire by condemnation property already devoted to a
public use."); Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, 126 Colo. 267, 273, 248 P.2d
732, 735 (1952) (en banc) ("Denver is a home-rule city and . . . Article XX of the
Colorado Constitution gives Denver ample power . . . to acquire by condemnation
property already devoted to public use . . . ."). Beth Medrosh stressed that the power
should be exercised only when "'the overwhelming necessities of the public were such
that, in order to serve their needs, . . . the taking. . . became necessary.'" Id. at 274,
248 P.2d at 735 (quoting Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. Denver & R.G. R.R., 30
Colo. 204, 212, 69 P. 568, 570 (1902)); see also City and County of Denver v. Board
of Comm'rs, 113 Colo. 150, 158, 156 P.2d 101, 104 (1945) (en banc) ("[P]roperty
devoted to a public use, under the stress of public necessity, may be condemned for
another public use."); cf. infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing the
"more necessary use" test).
60 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 8, § 2.2[2], at 2-81. Moreover, it has been held that
the implication "must arise only from the language used" in the grant of power. Vil-
lage of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St. 345, 352, 182 N.E.2d 557, 562
(1962).
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adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court when it was confronted
with a city's plan to construct a dam for a hydroelectric plant that
would submerge approximately twenty-five acres of a county home for
indigents and inundate county roads at fifteen places."1 Affirming a
trial court denial of the city's power to condemn the land, the court
disposed f the argument that the city had power to condemn by neces-
sary implication: "'If an implication is to be relied upon, it must ap-
pear from . . . the application [of the enactment] to the particular sub-
ject matter of it, so that . . . some especial object sought to be attained
by the exercise of the power granted could not be reached in any other
. . . manner.' "82
The latter, more flexible, stance was espoused by the Ohio Court
of Appeals when it allowed a board of county commissioners to con-
demn for airport expansion that portion of a village's property not re-
quired for municipal buildings.6" Ordinarily, the court conceded, the
power to take by necessary implication flows from statutory language;
however, "resort may be had to the legislative intent as evidenced by a
consideration of the statute with relation to its subject matter," and the
power to take may be "inferred from a comparison of the conflicting
powers conferred by the statute as well as the nature of the public
works respectively to be undertaken.""
This second, more flexible stance shades into a third, more contro-
6' See Yadkin County v. City of High Point, 217 N.C. 462, 463-64, 8 S.E.2d 470,
471 (1940).
62 Id. at 467, 8 S.E.2d at 473 (quoting In re City of Buffalo, 68 N.Y. 167, 175
(1877)); see also Vermont Hydro-Elec., 95 Vt. at 152, 112 A. at 227 ("Such implica-
tion never arises except as a necessary condition to the beneficial enjoyment . . . of the
power expressly granted."); 2 J. LEwIs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 440, at 793 (3d ed. 1909) (" '[S]uch implication arises
only from the language of the act. . . showing such taking to be necessary in order to
beneficially enjoy and efficiently exercise the rights and privileges granted . . .'"
(quoting Rutland-Canadian R.R. v. Central Vt. Ry., 72 Vt. 128, 133, 47 A. 399, 400
(1900) (footnote omitted))); 11 B. McQuILLIN, supra note 49, § 32.67, at 403 (same).
63 See Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Commr's, 112 Ohio App.
272, 284-85, 166 N.E.2d 143, 152 (1960), appeal dismissed per curiam, 171 Ohio St.
449, 172 N.E.2d 133 (1961).
Id. at 281, 166 N.E.2d at 150. Juxtaposing Richmond Heights with Village of
Blue Ash, one scholar has remarked upon the Ohio court's "resilience in avoiding its
own general rule." W. VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 293 (1975); cf. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co. v. City of Houma, 229 So. 2d 202, 207 (La. Ct. App.) ("[T]he
implied necessity rule applies in those instances where the language of the statute, to-
gether with the legislative creation of the expropriating agency and the nature of the
improvements authorized, require authority to expropriate property in public use."),
cert. denied, 254 La. 1165, 229 So. 2d 350 (1969); 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 8,
§ 2.211], at 2-78 ("[R]esort may be had to the determination of the legislative intent as
evinced by a consideration of the statute with relation to the matter with which it is
concerned.").
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versial approach to "necessary implication." This third approach com-
pares the relative value and importance of the competing uses to deter-
mine which use will more substantially benefit the public. In Township
of Weehawken v. Erie Railroad, 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court
modified the extent of township condemnation of railroad property for
municipal parking and recreational facilities. The court reasoned that
despite the benefit to the public from a parking lot, "it tends to lose
proportion where the project would exclude a railroad operation for
which the property is so highly adaptable.""6 The court noted that
some opinions had held that necessary implication "may only arise
from facts which demonstrate that an exercise of the power is necessary
to realize enjoyment of the privilege bestowed," while others had been
cast "in terms of reasonable necessity and comparative value of the con-
flicting interests."167 The court found persuasive support for the latter
approach in a treatise on eminent domain, which it quoted at some
length:
"As to the degree of necessity which must exist . . . the bet-
ter opinion is that it must be a reasonable one. Whether any
general rule can be laid down as to what will constitute a
reasonable necessity, may be doubted. But we should say
that there was a reasonable necessity for the taking where
the public interests would be better subserved thereby, or
where the advantages to the condemnor will largely exceed
the disadvantages to the condemnee."88
The court followed the lead of a New Jersey Superior Court decision
that had allowed a sewer authority to condemn vacant land owned by a
municipality.69 The earlier opinion also cited the treatise, stressed the
sewer authority's "health function of concern to the State and .. mu-
65 20 N.J. 572, 120 A.2d 593 (1956).
11 Id. at 585, 120 A.2d at 599.
67 Id. at 580, 120 A.2d at 597.
" Id. (quoting 2 J. LEwis, supra note 62, § 440, at 796). Actually, the quotation
is misleading. The court omits two immediately preceding sentences in A Treatise on
the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States that cast the quoted material in an
entirely different light: "Two conditions must concur in order to authorize such taking.
There must be some necessity therefor on the part of the condemnor and the taking
must not destroy or seriously impede the use to which the property is already devoted."
2 J. LEwis, supra note 62, § 440, at 795-96 (emphasis-added).
9 See Bergen County Sewer Auth. v. Borough of Little Ferry, 7 N.J. Super. 213,
72 A.2d 886 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 5 N.J. 548, 76 A.2d 680 (1950); see also
State Highway Comm'n v. City of Elizabeth, 102 N.J. Eq. 221, 224, 140 A. 335, 338
(Ch.) (allowing the condemnation of municipal property by the state highway commis-
sion based, in part, on the abbreviated quote of 2 J. LEWIS, supra note 62, § 440, at
796, discussed supra note 68), affid per curiam, 103 N.J. Eq. 376, 143 A. 916 (1928).
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nicipalities," and hinted that "power to condemn municipally owned
land used for lesser public needs or purposes might well be implied
within the legislative grant." 70 This hint was not dispositive, however,
because the land in dispute was not being used.
7 1
2. The More Necessary Use Test
The "more necessary use" test has assumed a variety of forms in
different jurisdictions. Some courts conceive of the more necessary use
test as an exception to the prior public use doctrine, applicable "when
the proposed use is of superior rank in respect of public necessity."
7
1
2
For example, when a city exercised its power of condemnation to "deal
affirmatively with the crucial problem of urban decay" and sought to
take land that was not indispensable to the operation of a public utility,
a New York Supreme Court approved the taking as "a situation where
the prior 'public use' must yield to the imperative of the greater public
need."T7
The Texas embodiment of the exception is narrowly drawn, de-
manding both that the "necessity be so great as to make the new enter-
prise of paramount importance to the public" and that it "cannot be
70 Bergen County, 7 N.J. Super. at 219-20, 72 A.2d at 889; see also Easthampton
v. County Comm'rs, 154 Mass. 424, 425, 28 N.E. 298, 298 (1891) ("We must consider
the relative importance and the necessities of the two uses generally, the extent of the
harm to be done, accept any light that history may throw, and make up our minds
under all the circumstances . . . ."); Note, Eminent Domain: Intergovernmental Con-
flicts, 29 IND. L.J. 206, 209 (1954) [hereinafter Note, Intergovernmental Conflicts]
("[T]he determination of necessary implication is really a determination of the best use
for the particular land.").
71 It should be noted that courts have sometimes gratuitously discovered "neces-
sary implication." See, e.g., Housing Auth. v. State Dep't of Transp., 385 So. 2d 690,
691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("Where one condemning authority possesses superior
condemnation powers the required legislative intent . . . is necessarily implied."); City
of Shakopee v. Clark, 295 N.W.2d 495, 498-99 (Minn. 1980) (noting that an implied
right to condemn may be found when a condemnee has not put its land to public use or
when proposed and pre-existing uses are not "substantially" inconsistent with those of
the condemnee).
72 Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. State Rd. Dep't, 176 So. 2d 111, 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965) (dictum); see D. MANDELKER, supra note 49, at 161; 1 P. NICHOLS, supra
note 8, § 2.2[3], at 2-82; Phay, supra note 49, at 354.
73 City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 54 Misc. 2d 855, 859, 283
N.Y.S.2d 631, 635 (Sup. Ct. 1967); see also Oklahoma City v. Local Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 192 Okla. 188, 196, 134 P.2d 565, 575 (1943) ("There are exceptions to [the]
rule, but the exceptions apply only in those instances where the second taking is neces-
sary to the public welfare."); cf. City of Buffalo v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 25,
27, 332 N.Y.S.2d 925, 928 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (public utility successfully resisted a taking
by the city on ground that "the priority of its present use outranks that contemplated in
the urban redevelopment plans" because of the "emergency nature of services
provided").
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practically accomplished in any other way." 4 This standard has been
held to empower a school district to condemn park land for the para-
mount public use of a school site,7" but did not support a public util-
ity's efforts to condemn, on the basis of its ability to provide better
service, municipally owned electric facilities situated outside city
limits.76
Finally, some cases have been decided by the application of "more
necessary use" provisions incorporated in state statutes.7" Looking to
previous adjudication under such a statute, the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana found a practice of weighing the benefits to be derived from the
condemnation against the impairments to the existing use of the land. 8
The court noted the "broad range of considerations in determining
whether a proposed public use is more necessary than the present
use."
79
"' Gulf State Pipe Line Co. v. Orange County Water Control & Improvement
Dist., 526 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); see also Fort Worth & D. Ry. v.
City of Houston, 672 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a condem-
nation that would practically destroy a property's existing use would be prohibited
unless it was proven that the new enterprise was "of paramount public importance"
and "its purpose [could not] be otherwise accomplished"); cf. State v. T.O.L., Inc., 206
So. 2d 69, 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ("A particular public easement may be im-
posed upon land already subject to a different public easement even in the absence of
express legislative authority where the subsequent use is for a public purpose of...
paramount importance which cannot be accomplished in any other practical way
. . . .)").
11 See Austin Indep. School Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 880, 882 (Tex.
1973); ef. El Paso County v. City of El Paso, 357 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962) (dictum) ("[Olne political subdivision . . . can condemn the land of another, the
decision resting, of course, on the paramount use and the best interests of the public.");
Harris County Drainage Dist. v. City of Houston, 35 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1931) (stating hypothetically that the city may exercise its power of eminent do-
main in order to make improvements for the benefit of its citizens "if the necessity be so
great as to make the new enterprise of paramount importance to the public and can be
practically accomplished in no other way"); Dau, supra note 3, at 1522-23 (discussing
"paramount use").
78 See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Houma, 229 So. 2d 202, 211 (La.
Ct. App.) (applying a standard identical to that applied in Texas: the use "may be of
such paramount public importance as to justify taking of property devoted to a lesser
• . . use, where the superior use cannot be accomplished in any other practicable man-
ner."), cert. denied, 254 La. 1165, 229 So. 2d 350 (1969).
" See, e.g., State v. City of Big Timber, 165 Mont. 328, 334, 528 P.2d 688, 691
(1974) (statute requires that public property be condemned only if proposed use is
more necessary than existing use); Board of Educ. v. Park Dist., 70 N.W.2d 899, 906
(N.D. 1955) (same). For a critique detailing the shortcomings of such statutory provi-
sions, see Matteoni, supra note 22, at 569-70 (acknowledging that the legislature "can-
not possibly define an order of public use priorities that would cover every situation,"
but nevertheless faulting the uncertainties regarding interpretation of the phrase "more
necessary public use").
78 See City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co., 743 P.2d 590, 595 (Mont. 1987).
79 Id.
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The prior public use model posited in Part II of this Comment
opts for the Texas embodiment of the "more necessary use" test as the
best way to reconcile "occupation" and "social utility" considerations in
public use conflicts. A prior public use doctrine without such a test
risks rigidly overprotecting possession at the expense of social utility,
while, on the other hand, a broader version of the test risks an undue
subordination of possession to the "greater good" of social utility. 0
F. The "Character" of the Condemnor and Condemnee
The foregoing "more necessary use" inquiry introduces the last
interpretive concern generated by the prior public use doctrine: the
question of the significance to be attributed to the nature or status-the
"character," as the treatises put it 8 -of the condemnor and con-
demnee s2 Some courts rationalize the condemnation by a municipality
of a public service corporation's facilities, for the same use, on the
ground that "the use by the municipal corporation is a more necessary
one than is the use by a private organization." 8 Unfortunately, the
opinions purporting to rest on a "more necessary use" rationale some-
times do not so much proffer reasoned analysis of how the same use is
transformed into a more necessary use under different hands as they
make the bare assertion "municipal, ergo more necessary."
In Duck River Electric Membership Corp. v. City of
Manchester,8 the Tennessee Supreme Court articulated the assump-
tions underlying this rationale:
[W]hile we cast no aspersions upon these corporations ...
the fact remains that they are manifestly low-grade, volun-
teer public service type corporations, inferior in all respects,
to municipalities which exist for the purpose of general gov-
ernment. Cities enjoy perpetual succession . . . .They enjoy
a higher degree of permanency and a greater degree of
80 See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
81 See 11 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 49; § 32.72, at 414; 1 P. NICHOLS, supra
note 8, § 2.2, at 2-55.
82 This topic was discussed supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
83 Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 504, 445 P.2d 720,
725 (1968): see also People ex rel. Public Util. Comm'n v. City of Fresno, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 76, 85, 62 Cal. Rptr. 79, 85 (1967) ("[T]he Legislature has expressly stated
that when public utility property already appropriated to public use is condemned by a
city, the contemplated city use is 'the more necessary public use' as a matter of law.");
cf. Santa Cruz Irrigation Dist. v. City of Tucson, 108 Ariz. 152, 153, 494 P.2d 24, 25
(1972) ("[W]here the public use is incidental to the basic purpose of the organization of
an irrigation district, the services are a more necessary public use when offered by a
municipality.").
84 529 S.W.2d 202 (Tenn. 1975).
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stability.
... [T]here can be no legitimate contention but that
the city distribution of electric current will be a higher pub-
lic use.
Manchester may condemn. It will hold the property so
acquired for the general public benefit, with a higher and
larger scope of use and under a more stable and responsive
system. 5
As a treatise on eminent domain has stated, "If . . . the purpose of
such acquisition is to transfer the ownership and operation . . . from a
public service corporation . . . to a municipality . . it has been held
that the greater public use and increased public benefit which result
from governmental operation justify such acquisition."86
Nevertheless, discordant voices can also be heard on this issue. In
City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co.,8 7 the city sought to acquire a
privately owned water distribution business through condemnation. Be-
cause the water was already appropriated to a public use, the district
court had to determine, under the relevant statute, whether the city's
use would constitute a "more necessary public use"; it held that the city
had failed to prove that the taking of the system was necessary. 8 The
Supreme Court of Montana remanded, directing the district court to
weigh the benefits of public versus private ownership of the water sys-
s Id. at 206-07; see also City of Blue Springs, 684 S.W.2d at 51 (" 'A municipal
corporation is a public and governmental agency. It [holds] property for the general
benefit, with a larger scope of use.'" (quoting Illinois Cities Water Co. v. City of
Mount Vernon, 11 Ill. 2d 547, 554, 144 N.E.2d 729, 733 (1957))).
88 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 8, § 2.2[9], at 2-102; see also City of Palm Bay v.
General Dev. Utils., 201 So. 2d 912, 915-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (citing 1 P. NICH-
OLs, supra note 8, § 2.39[9], and adding that "[s]urely as a policy consideration the
petitioner's citizenry, operating through their selected representatives have a right to
expect their governmental unit to provide them with services within its proper sphere"),
cert. denied, 207 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1967); City of Shakopee v. Minnesota Valley Elec.
Coop., 303 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 1981) (citing 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 8, § 2.2[9],
at 2-102); 11 E. MCQuILLIN, supra note 49, § 32.69, at 407-08 (municipality may
take the property of a private corporation if the public interest is better served); Dau,
supra note 3, at 1520-21 (stating that a greater public use justifies a municipality
taking property devoted to a public use and applying it to the same use, although a
private corporation cannot do the same); Note, Municipal Acquisition of Public Utili-
ties, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 534 (1934) ("[I]n the hands of a governmental agency
the plant will be run primarily, and not incidentally, for the cdnvenience of the commu-
nity-the 'same' use thus becomes a 'more necessary' one.").
87 743 P.2d 590 (Mont. 1987).
8 See id. at 595.
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tem."9 These instructions elicited a strong dissent, which argued:
Where the majority stray into error is their implicit assump-
tion that the City of Missoula, as a governmental entity,
stands in a better position as a condemnor for purposes of
public use than Mountain Water Company, a private corpo-
ration. No such distinction is made in our statutes ...
This case is not the stage on which to debate public owner-
ship versus private ownership of property. Public ownership
of Missoula's water supply system cannot be a factor of ne-
cessity, because all condemnors, whether public or private,
stand on equal footing before the law in condemnation
proceedings.90
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held, in City of Pryor Creek v.
Public Service Co.,91 that the general power of eminent domain did not
authorize a municipality to condemn a public service corporation's fa-
cilities and use them for the same purpose, absent specific statutory
authorization.92 The court reasoned that the legislature had demon-
strated its awareness of this insufficiency by enacting specific statutes,
none of which applied in the instant case, "to deal with these
problems."93 Apparently unpersuaded by the higher public use ration-
ale, the court argued that "[t]o hold otherwise would amount simply to
the taking of property from one and destroying his right to operate
although expressly authorized to do so, and giving it to another without
any benefit to the public."9 4
Similarly, in Town of Culpeper v. Virginia Electric and Power
Co.,95 the Virginia Supreme Court found no procedure in Virginia
"under which annexing towns and cities can acquire by eminent do-
main the facilities of a franchised utility."98 The court stressed that a
certificate of public convenience is a property right, entitled to protec-
tion by the courts. 7
An analogous split in authority appears when a political subdivi-
sion seeks to condemn the land of a public use corporation and put it to
a different use. One view is that "[a] municipal corporation having the
11 See id. at 596.
90 Id. at 597 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
91 536 P.2d 343 (OkIa. 1975).
92 See id. at 347.
93 Id. at 346.
94 Id.
95 215 Va. 189, 207 S.E.2d 864 (1974).
98 Id. at 193, 207 S.E.2d at 867.
17 See id. at 193-94, 207 S.E.2d at 867-68.
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right of eminent domain stands no differently before the courts than a
private corporation clothed with the same right.""8 On the other hand,
as the North Carolina Supreme Court has explained, some courts have
discriminated between municipal corporations and private corporations
when applying the prior public use doctrine.99 These courts would ex-
tend the full protection of the doctrine when a political subdivision is
the resisting land owner by "strictly observ[ing]" its provisions, but
would "somewhat relax" the rule's rigor when a public service corpo-
ration is the condemnee because "in the [political subdivision] the pub-
lic interest alone is supposed to prevail while in the [private corpora-
tion] the idea of private enterprise also plays a part."' 00
The character of the condemnor attains the greatest significance
when the court finds the condemnor to be the sovereign itself.101 When
the condemnor is the sovereign, or is acting on behalf of the sovereign,
courts generally defer to the taking and deem the prior public use doc-
trine inapposite. 102 However, just when the condemnor is the sovereign
11 Vermont Hydro-Elect., 95 Vt. at 153, 112 A. at 227; see also Florida E. Coast
Ry. v. City of Miami, 321 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. 1975) (refusing to distinguish a cause
involving two public bodies from a cause involving a public body and a franchised
public use company); Cemetery Co. v. Warren School Township, 236 Ind. 171, 186,
139 N.E.2d 538, 545 (1957) ("The public use of land by a private utility for water,
light, and communication might appear to many persons to be of as great, if not
greater, public concern and interest than that of some other governmental uses which
might be asked in the name of the sovereign state."); Kansas City v. Ashley, 406
S.W.2d 584, 590 (Mo. 1966) (holding that the city lacked the power to condemn rail-
road property already devoted to public use).
11 See Yadkin County, 217 N.C. at 466, 8 S.E.2d at 473; see also Cemetery Co.,
236 Ind. at 185-86, 139 N.E.2d at 545 ("Such jurisdictions hold that a state or its
agency (as distinguished from a private corporation or privately owned utility exercis-
ing the power of eminent domain) under a general grant of power may take property
already devoted to a public use by a private corporation such as a railroad, cemetery
company, or utility. This is done on the theory that the governmental body is acting for
the sovereign . . ").
100 Yadkin County, 217 N.C. at 466, 85 S.E.2d at 473.
101 For pronouncements of the paramount significance of the character of the con-
demnor, see Hiland v. Ives, 154 Conn. 683, 688, 228 A.2d 502, 504 (1967); Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Houma, 229 So. 2d 202, 206 (La. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 254 La. 1165, 229 So. 2d 350 (1969); 1 P. NiCHOLS, supra note 8, § 2.2, at 2-
55.
102 See, e.g., Hiland, 154 Conn. at 688, 228 A.2d at 504 ("But the rule does not
apply where the sovereign itself is the condemnor and is taking the property on its own
behalf and for its own sovereign purposes."); City of Wilmington v. Lord, 340 A.2d
182, 183-84 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) ("[A]s a home rule city, Wilmington is to be con-
sidered the sovereign for the purposes of municipal functions," and it can take public
property by eminent domain.); Housing Auth. v. State Dep't of Transp., 385 So. 2d
690, 691-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (The Department of Transportation "is the
sovereign when acting in the area of State road building," and therefore the prior pub-
lic use doctrine does not apply.); Louisiana Power & Light Co., 229 So. 2d at 206
(" 'If the sovereign on its own behalf seeks to acquire such property by eminent do-
main, the fact that the land sought to be taken is public property generally is immate-
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is unclear. Some cases establish a dichotomy between delegation and
agency: if the condemnor is a municipal or private corporation to which
the state has delegated a portion of its sovereign power of eminent do-
main, then the prior public use doctrine is operative; if, on the other
hand, the condemnor is the designated agent of the state, typically a
state highway commission or department of transportation, then the
state is acting through its agent and the power is, in effect, exercised by
the state itself, rendering the rule inoperative."' Other cases, however,
do not divorce the concepts of delegation and agency and hold that the
prior public use doctrine applies when the power of eminent domain
has been delegated to an agent.'04
The prior public use model advocated in Part II of this Comment
does not attach significance to the character of the condemnor and con-
demnee when a political subdivision seeks to acquire property of a pub-
lic service corporation. Such a jurisdictional exercise undermines the
"occupation" element in property without enhancing the "social utility"
element.' 05
rial.'" (quoting State v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 242 La. 682, 689, 138 So. 2d 109,
112 (1961))); Dau, supra note 3, at 1520 ("Whenever the interests of the public re-
quire, the state may condemn for a different public use property previously devoted to a
public use.").
103 See Hiland, 154 Conn. at 691-92, 228 A.2d at 506; Southern Ry. v. State
Highway Dep't, 219 Ga. 435, 439, 134 S.E.2d 12, 15-16 (1963); cf. Note, Intergovern-
mental Conflicts, supra note 70, at 209 (noting that courts regard state agencies and
home rule cities as acting for the sovereign).
104 See, e.g., City of Wilmington, 340 A.2d at 184 (stating as a general rule that
"the sovereign may take public property . . .but that an agency of the sovereign to
whom eminent domain has been delegated may only take public property if the legisla-
ture has manifested its consent to the taking ... in express terms or by necessary
implication"); Louisiana Power & Light Co., 229 So. 2d at 206 ("[A] subdivision or
agency of the state does not possess authority to expropriate property in public use
unless such authority is expressly conferred .... "); cf Southern Ry., 219 Ga. at 442-
44, 134 S.E.2d at 17-18 (Duckworth, O.J., partially concurring in judgment, partially
dissenting in judgment, and dissenting in opinion) ("[I]t is begging the question . . . to
say that the Highway Department is the State. . . .The State legislature invested the
Highway Department with the power to take private property for a public use by
eminent domain . . . in the same degree and only to the extent it did this rail-
road .... A reference to the legislative Acts which confer upon the Department the
right to take property . . . shows that they simply delegated that power to the depart-
ment. . . ."); Note, Intergovernmental Conflicts, supra note 70, at 210 ("There is no
sound reason for holding state agencies and home rule cities to a different standard
from political subdivisions and nongovernmental bodies.").
The ambiguities are compounded by language indicating that state government is
administered through the agency of municipalities. See, e.g., Medical Center Comm'n
v. Powell, 124 Ill. App. 2d 123, 131, 260 N.E.2d 261, 264 (1970) (" 'The statute does
not authorize the taking of the property of the state, or of the subordinate municipali-
ties through whose agency the state government is administered, by the exercise of the
right of eminent domain.'" (quoting City of Edwardsville v. County of Madison, 251
Ill. 265, 266-67, 96 N.E. 238, 238 (1911))).
105 See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
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II. A MODEL PRIOR PUBLIC USE JURISPRUDENCE
The preceding analysis of variations in judicial interpretation and
application of the prior public use doctrine serves here as a springboard
for evaluating the appropriate judicial role in prior public use adjudica-
tion. It is safe enough to assert that the question whether property is
being "used" is a question of fact to be determined by the courts;l0 6
that the question whether a use is a public use is an issue to be resolved
by the courts; 0 7 that the question whether uses are compatible is a
factual question to be determined by the courts;... that the degree of
necessity required to give rise to an implication of legislative authoriza-
tion of taking is a judicial question; 109 and that under "more necessary
use" statutes the question of greater necessity is properly tried to the
court. l 0 But should the issue of public use be resolved with reference to
a bright line rule or on an ad hoc basis? Should a necessary implication
of legislative authorization require absolute or merely reasonable neces-
sity? Should courts weigh the relative importance of competing
uses-either with the blessing of statutes or without?
A. The "Occupation" and "Social Utility" Theories of Property
In order to answer the questions posed above, this Comment first
formulates its own policy underpinnings for the prior public use doc-
trine, importing by analogy to private ownership the "occupation" and
"social utility" theories of property. As Part I noted, the doctrine's tal-
ismanic stature has reduced analysis of the reasons for the rule to a
reflex recitation that contributes nothing to a resolution of problems in
prior public use adjudication.1 '
Private ownership theories may be readily transplanted to a public
use context and applied to municipal and private corporations alike. As
Gerald Frug has demonstrated, in pre-nineteenth century England and
America, public and private corporations, cities and businesses, were
not distinguished; all these corporations had the same legal rights.11 2
106 See East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. City of Lodi, 120 Cal. App. 740, 753, 8 P.2d
532, 537 (1932); Vermont Hydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 150, 112 A. 223,
226 (1921).
10' See City of New Haven v. Town of E. Haven, 35 Conn. Supp. 157, 165, 402
A.2d 345, 350 (1977), affd, 177 Conn. 749, 419 A.2d 349 (1979); Tuomey Hosp. v.
City of Sumter, 243 S.C. 544, 552, 134 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1964).
108 See Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343, 350, 225 N.W.
164, 167 (1929); Ball, supra note 8, at 35.
109 See 1 P. NICHOLs, supra note 8, § 2.2[3], at 2-82.
110 See Board of Educ. v. Park Dist., 70 N.W.2d 899, 905 (N.D. 1955).
1 See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
112 See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1082 (1980).
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The adoption in nineteenth century America of the public/private dis-
tinction assigned private corporations the identity of "per-
sons"11 -relegating them to the "Lockean sphere of rights"n1 -but
assigned cities the identity of state subdivisions 11-relegating them to
the "Hobbesian sphere of command"1 6 and domination by state legis-
lative power.11 7 The twentieth century erosion of the public/private di-
chotomy, however, has undercut the conventional bases for distinguish-
ing public from private corporations." 8 Frug reveals "the virtual
impossibility of a meaningful, nonpolitical distinction between functions
'naturally' performed by public or by private corporations, between
'public goods' and 'private goods.' "119
The best rationale for the prior public use doctrine, then, is its
potential for accommodating both the "occupation" and "social utility"
aspects of property. On the one hand, "occupation" values direct that
possession should be protected. 2 ° On the other hand, "social utility"
values direct that property should be used in the manner that best pro-
motes the "maximum fulfillment of human needs." " ' Of course, these
two views of property are not mutually exclusive. Richard Posner, for
example, has argued that the "legal protection of property rights cre-
113 Id. at 1121.
114 Id. at 1095.
15 See id. at 1121.
116 Id. at 1095.
117 See id. at 1120-21.
118 See id. at 1139-40.
119 Id. at 1138. Frug depicts the courts' failure to draw a workable "public/pri-
vate [i.e., governmental/proprietary] distinction within municipal corporation law" and
then pointedly observes the irony of "[tihis ability [of the courts] to denounce the pub-
lic/private distinction within municipal corporation law while insisting upon it when
comparing cities to private corporations." Id. at 1140 n.359; see also D. MANDELKER,
supra note 49, at 438 (describing the "universally acknowledged" confusion in "judicial
attempts to define what is governmental and what is proprietary"); Reynolds, The Ju-
dicial Role in Intergovernmental Land Use Disputes: The Case Against Balancing,
71 MINN. L. RPv. 611, 623 (1987) (stating that many courts suggest the distinction
between governmental and proprietary functions "is illusory"); cf. Wells & Hellerstein,
The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REv.
1073, 1136 (1980) ("The terms 'governmental' and 'proprietary' are best viewed as
labels expressing the conclusion that particular government activity should be accorded
a particular legal status and not as standards to be used in reaching such a conclu-
sion. . . . Courts could pursue each of the purposes [the governmental/proprietary dis-
tinction] serves by focusing directly on the underlying values themselves . . ").
120 See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 3, at 2; Cohen, Property and Sovereignty,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 15 (1927).
121 R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 3, at 2; see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF LAw 18 (1972) ("These observations suggest an economic principle for deciding,
in cases of conflicting land (or other property) uses, which party shall have the right to
exclude the other. The right should be assigned to the party whose use is the more
valuable . . ").
1988]
258 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ates incentives to use resources efficiently,"' 22 while Bentham's "idea of
property" as "an established expectation"' 23 posits that only through
protection of such an expectation "can we hope for a minimally accept-
able level of productivity."' 24 Nevertheless, there is a tension between
the "occupation" and "social utility" notions of property. The former
justifies legal protection of a possessor's claim by virtue of the simple
fact of possession, regardless of whether the property is used to promote
the greater good; the latter validates legal protection of property based
upon its successful promotion of human needs and aspirations. 2 The
tension is between the "dominion" and "social" views of property, the
former emphasizing discreteness, even atomism, the latter emphasizing
the social whole.'
28
B. The Tension in the Rule and a Principle for its Resolution
The occupation-social utility tension animates the prior public use
doctrine. Any implementation of the doctrine that forecloses evaluation
of the "more necessary use" risks inflexibly overprotecting posses-
sion-the "abstract rights of ownership"' 217-at the expense of social
value. In this scenario, courts labor under the constraint of excessive
deference to the pre-existing use, sacrificing the flexibility necessary to
realize "the imperative of the greater public need"' 28 or the "stress of
public necessity."' 29 Yet a premise insistently asserted by courts and
commentators-that the formulation of public policy is the province of
the legislature, not the courts-disposes of the question whether courts
should weigh the relative importance of competing uses absent statutory
directives, as it is for the legislature to decide which uses redound to the
greater public benefit.' 30
The nexus of an "occupation" property orientation with a re-
strained conception of the judicial function culminates in judicial pro-
"' R. POSNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 30 (3d ed. 1986).
123 J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112 (C. Ogden ed. 1931).
124 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of 'just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. Ruv. 1165, 1212 (1967).
125 See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 3, at 2.
128 See Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L.
REv. 583, 587 (1981).
127 Note, The Constitutionality of Rent Control Restrictions on Property Owners'
Dominion Interests, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1067, 1085 (1987).
128 City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 54 Misc. 2d 855, 859, 283
N.Y.S.2d 631, 635 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
129 City & County of Denver v. Board of Comm'rs, 113 Colo. 150, 158, 156 P.2d
101, 104 (1945).
'20 See Vermont Hydro-Elect. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 153, 112 A. 223, 227
(1921).
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nouncements such as "[t]he doctrine of prior public use does not clothe
the court with power to weigh the communal benefit of the proposed
use against the present use of property sought to be condemned" '131 and
"the determination of the relative values and importance of different
public uses . . . is purely a legislative matter-one of policy to be de-
termined in the legislative halls and not in the court room."1 2 The
commentators are in substantial agreement, 3' one arguing that when
courts consider the total impact of an acquisition upon the region, they
act as land planning bodies in a legislative function that transcends
their institutional competence.13
Taken to an extreme, however, this argument culminates in a dis-
juncture between the courts and social exigency, a disjuncture revealed,
for example, by such rigidly categorical pronouncements as "[t]his case
must be controlled by legal principles and not by considering the practi-
cal effect . . ,.". Such arid dogmatism seems especially incongruous
in a land use context, when social utility, and perhaps even the solution
of a crisis, is at stake. Moreover, to maintain that when the legislature
enacts a statute conferring the power of eminent domain, it hands down
its formulation of the best means to effectuate the greater public good,
is to ignore reality; because "at the time a general grant is enacted, the
controversy has not arisen," and the legislative process cannot respond
adequately to subsequent conflicts. 3 The legislature cannot possibly
anticipate every clash between public uses, and a wooden adherence to
the prior public use doctrine means that every time a conflict arises, the
legislature must enact special legislation."' 7 Furthermore, it is disingen-
"' Board of Educ. v. Pace College, 27 A.D.2d 87, 90, 276 N.Y.S.2d 162, 165
(1966), motion denied, 19 N.Y.2d 672, 225 N.E.2d 554, 278 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1967).
132 Cemetery Co. v. Warren School Township, 236 Ind. 171, 187, 139 N.E.2d
538, 545 (1957); see also Board of Supervisors v. Board of County Supervisors, 206
Va. 730, 734, 146 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1966) (agreeing with language to the effect that
courts of equity should not weigh the importance of conflicting appropriations of prop-
erty or make equitable adjustments of the rights of the parties).
113 See, e.g., 11 E. MCQUILUN, supra note 49, § 32.67, at 402 (stating that the
"relative necessity and expediency of such uses are matters of legislative policy"); Ball,
supra note 8, at 35 (noting the "essentially legislative character of the determination of
necessity"); id. at 45 ("The devotion of property to public needs is a legislative problem
.... "); Dau, supra note 3, at 1526 ("It also seems more fitting to have the legislature
determine which uses shall be more necessary . . .
11 See Phay, supra note 49, at 370, 373-74.
135 Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St. 345, 352, 182 N.E.2d
557, 562 (1962).
13" Note, Intergovernmental Conflicts, supra note 70, at 210. This argument se-
riously undercuts the judicial rationalization of the prior public use doctrine as a means
of effectuating legislative intent. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
137 See Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 579, 120 A.2d 593,
596 (1956); see also Ball, supra note 8, at 33 (stating that the view that changes must
depend on a special statute has been rejected). This problem has prompted legislatures
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uous to imply that courts do not embroil themselves in policy mat-
ters; 38 the process of weighing conflicting interests is also not unheard
of in the judiciary: "Only the courts are qualified to weigh the conflict-
ing interests, thus, it is their duty to see that the best use for the partic-
ular land prevails."'3 9
If the "occupation" theory-judicial restraint nexus lends itself to
an absolute property rule that impedes the courts from considering soci-
etal interests,14' an unbridled "social utility" tilt conferring broad li-
cense to evaluate the "more necessary use" lends itself to virtual nullifi-
cation of the possessory protections the prior public use doctrine
affords. For example, in NL Industries, Inc. v. Eisenman Chemical
Co., 4 ' Eisenman, a competitor of NL in the barite mining industry,
sought to occupy a portion of NL's mining property.'44 NL was hold-
ing barite in reserve, while Eisenman planned immediate extraction of
the ore.14 3 Based on these facts, the district court had granted Eisenman
exclusive and immediate occupancy, because "the holding of mineral
reserves is a mining use, but the development and mining of mineral
to amend statutes to provide for the taking of public property. See, e.g., City of E.
Peoria v. Group Five Dev. Co., 87 Ill. 2d 42, 45-46, 429 N.E.2d 492, 493-94 (1981)
(discussing such a legislative amendment in Illinois).
Is8 See Baker v. Sockwell, 80 Colo. 309, 311, 251 P. 543, 544 (1926) (en banc);
Great N. Oil Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 291 Minn. 97, 103, 189 N.W.2d
404, 408 (1971); Isherwood v. H.L. Jenkins Lumber Co., 87 Minn. 388, 390, 92 N.W.
230, 231 (1902); Tillinghast v. Merrill, 151 N.Y. 135, 136, 45 N.E. 375, 375 (1896);
Sochemaro v. Rossetti, 6 Misc. 2d 23, 26, 161 N.Y.S.2d 454, 458 (Civ. Ct. 1957); S.S.
Kresge Co. v. Port of Longview, 18 Wash. App. 805, 810, 573 P.2d 1336, 1340 (1977);
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 386-88, 335 N.W.2d
361, 365-67 (1983).
139 Note, Intergovernmental Conflicts, supra note 70, at 210-11 (footnotes omit-
ted). Regarding the general issue of the weighing of conflicting interests by courts, see
Drummond v. Stahl, 127 Ariz. 122, 126, 618 P.2d 616, 620 (Ct. App. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981); Calligan v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. Rptr. 388, 391-92
(1986); Peterson v. Town of Oxford, 189 Conn. 740, 746, 459 A.2d 100, 103 (1983);
Thomas Patrick, Inc. v. KWK Inv. Co., 357 Mo. 100, 104, 206 S.W.2d 359, 360
(1947); State ex rel. Anheuser v. Nolan, 692 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
State ex rel. Hoffman v. Campbell, 428 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968);
Cynthia B. v. New Rochelle Hosp. Medical Center, 60 N.Y.2d 452, 461, 458 N.E.2d
363, 368, 470 N.Y.S.2d 122, 127 (1983); People v. Riley, 98 Misc. 2d 454, 458, 414
N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 794, 208
N.Y.S.2d 564, 569 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Hyszko v. Barbour, 448 A.2d 723, 726 (R.I.
1982).
140 Cf Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REv. 631, 663 n.211
(1986) ("With industrialization and urbanization, conflicts occurred increasingly be-
tween property owners and it became clear that applying absolute property rules could
no longer resolve those conflicts. It was necessary to consider the interest of society
. . . ."1).
141 98 Nev. 253, 645 P.2d 976 (1982).
142 See id. at 255, 645 P.2d at 978.
14 See id. at 256, 645 P.2d at 979.
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rights or a mineral deposit is a more necessary public use."1 4 The
Supreme Court of Nevada rejected the lower court's determination that
"immediate extraction and production of mineral resources [constituted]
• . . a more necessary public use than holding ore in reserve for future
mining."' 45
In this scenario, when the test in effect displaces the doctrine and
invites a weighing of the importance of the proposed use against that of
the pre-existing use, courts are tempted to assume the role of social
engineer, abdicating their responsibilities as guardians of ownership
rights. It is precisely the judiciary's responsiveness to these rights, how-
ever, that furnishes the most powerful argument for judicial involve-
ment in public use conflicts, in contrast to those commentators who ad-
vocate such drastic curtailment of judicial involvement as to obviate any
need for a prior public use doctrine. Robert Phay proposes a state land
planning agency to adjudicate conflicts in the intergovernmental con-
text, with judicial review limited to procedural considerations. 46
Vaughn Ball proposes the establishment of a clearly demarcated hierar-
chy of regulatory agencies that would have jurisdiction to approve or
order condemnations on the "more necessary'1 47 use basis because "[it]
is better to draw a few clear lines of authority than to expose each case
to the toils of litigation." '48
The reply to such proposals is that conflicts between public uses
implicate concerns not only of social utility and efficiency, "matter[s] of
engineering," 49 but also possessory rights. The courts, more than any
narrowly specialized agency, are competent to be cognizant of, and re-
sponsive to, these rights. 5 Such responsiveness is especially crucial in
144 Id. at 256-57, 645 P.2d at 979.
145 Id. at 257, 645 P.2d at 979.
148 See Phay, supra note 49, at 375, 379-80.
147 Ball, supra note 8, at 42.
148 Id. at 45. However, Ball acknowledges that this proposal is more practicable
at the federal level and encounters thorny obstacles at the intrastate level, where "the
outlines of the hierarchy necessary to the jurisdictional method are indefinite....
Counties, townships, municipalities, and special-purpose districts form a stratification
many layers deep over the same land area. Their relative authorities are uncertain
.... " Id. at 43; see also Note, Intergovernmental Conflicts, supra note 70, at 211
(noting that coordination of agencies empowered to acquire land would be more diffi-
cult at the state level).
149 Ball, supra note 8, at 45.
150 Cf P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL
168 (1976) (stating that specialized courts with specialized judges may be 1) vulnerable
to political manipulation; 2) conducive to an obliviousness to "the basic values at stake
in their decisions"; and 3) considered less prestigious and therefore not attractive to
more able judges); Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195,
234-35 (1975) (discussing such inherent disadvantages of specialized courts as 1) judi-
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the condemnation context, because the power of eminent domain is
"one of the attributes of sovereignty most susceptible of abuse and in-
justice." '151 And "absolute discretionary power" may be "a dangerous
power in the hands of a[] . . . state agency. 152
Therefore, courts should, even as they are mindful of the impor-
tance of social utility and development, be vigilant against "the whims
of an operator of a slide rule or drawer of a blueprint"153' and against
the use of "the strong arm of government. . . to take property already
dedicated to a proper public use."'" Regarding the preference for
"clear lines of authority" to "the toils of litigation," the judicial
"reluctan[ce] to approve governmental shortcuts when personal and
property rights are involved 1 55 is a more prudent view. As the Illinois
Appellate Court has stated, "With the court being the arbiter we have
assurance that there will not be an abuse by public bodies in their exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain."1 ' Furthermore, agency adjudi-
cation has been criticized as "often mistake ridden and hampered by a
variety of institutional and bureaucratic constraints that undercut the
quality of deliberation. 15
Thus, the unbridled "social utility" tilt conferring broad license to
evaluate the "more necessary use" lends itself to virtual nullification of
the possessory protections afforded by the prior public use doctrine,
while the "occupation" theory-judicial restraint nexus lends itself to an
absolute property rule that impedes the courts from considering societal
interests. The tension is inherent in the doctrine. The best rationale for
the doctrine, however, is its potential for accommodating both the "oc-
cupation" and "social utility" aspects of property in order to resolve the
tension. This potential is realized by the courts' ability, and duty, to be
responsive to both aspects of property in interpreting and applying the
cial "tunnel vision," in which cases are viewed only in narrow perspective and the law
becomes excessively esoteric; 2) the risk that specialized judges might impose their per-
sonal policy views; 3) the potential for undue compromises in the quality of appoint-
ments; 4) the potential for special interest groups to "capture" the court; and 5) the
temptation to stint on the production of reasoned opinions to support decisions).
' Recent Cases, Eminent Domain-Power of One Public Utility Corporation to
Condemn Land of Similar Corporation, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 914, 914 (1932).
... State Highway Comm'n v. City of Elizabeth, 102 N.J. Eq. 221, 229, 140 A.
335, 338 (Ch.), affd, 103 N.J. Eq. 376, 143 A. 916 (1928).
1"3 Southern Ry. v. State Highway Dep't, 219 Ga. 435, 444, 134 S.E.2d 12, 18
(1963) (Duckworth, C.J., partially concurring in judgment, partially dissenting in
judgment, and dissenting in opinion).
15 Southern Ry. v. City of Greensboro, 247 N.C. 321, 328-29, 101 S.E.2d 347,
355 (1957).
155 Id. at 330, 101 S.E.2d at 355.
... City of E. Peoria v. Group Five Dev. Co., 90 Ill. App. 3d 729, 733, 413
N.E.2d 472, 476 (1980), affd, 87 Ill. 2d 42, 429 N.E.2d 492 (1981).
157 Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 440 (1982).
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prior public use doctrine. The principle is judicial protection of posses-
sion or occupation, tempered by judicial mindfulness of the desirability
of utilizing property in the most socially valuable way. This principle
generates specific rules for interpretation and application that are re-
sponsive to the tension.
C. Resolving the Tension: The Paramount Importance Test
The principle adduced above is achieved neither by an absolute
property rule nor by an open invitation to an ad hoc weighing of the
"more necessary use." Instead, this principle is most faithfully effectu-
ated by the narrowly drawn formulation of the "paramount impor-
tance" test, requiring that the proposed use be of paramount necessity
to the public and that it cannot be practically accomplished in any other
way.15 This formulation enables courts to be responsive to both the
"social utility" and "occupation" elements of prior public use adjudica-
tion. Requiring the condemnor to satisfy the heightened standard that
the proposed use be of paramount importance to the public should de-
mand a more compelling showing of exigency than the "more neces-
sary" standard. The further requirement that the use cannot be practi-
cally accomplished in any other way imposes on the condemnor the
burden of demonstrating that it has considered the feasibility of effect-
ing its allegedly paramount use through less intrusive means. For ex-
ample, in Central Power & Light Co. v. Willacy County,1 59 the county
sought to take the power company's right of way in order to widen the
adjacent highway. The extension would require removal of the com-
pany's electrical poles, wires, and other equipment. Reversing a judg-
15 This test, sometimes referred to as the "Texas rule," originated in Sabine &
E.T. Ry. v. Gulf & I. Ry., 92 Tex. 162, 46 S.W. 784 (1898). In that case, a parcel of
land acquired by one railroad for yard purposes and dedicated to public use was sought
for condemnation by another railroad that wished to obtain a crossing in order to con-
nect with a third line. The crossing would have destroyed the use of the land for yard
purposes. The Texas Supreme Court held that
the law does not authorize the condemnation of property which has al-
ready been dedicated to a public use, when such condemnation would
practically destroy the use to which it has been devoted . . . unless the
necessity be so great as to make the new enterprise of paramount impor-
tance to the public and cannot be practically accomplished in any other
way.
Id. at 166, 46 S.W. at 786. The court emphasized the "paramount importance" re-
quirement, holding that the new use must be "of so great importance to the public as to
demand that another public use of less importance shall be set aside for its benefit
.... " Id. at 168, 46 S.W. at 787. One commentator has noted that this requirement
is apparently peculiar to Texas. See Dau, supra note 3, at 1522-23.
For a general discussion of the Texas rule, see id. at 1522-26.
159 14 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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ment of condemnation, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals acknowledged
that the widening of a great public highway could easily be of such
paramount importance to the public to justify the taking.160 The court
stressed, however, that the additional requisite-that there was "no
other practical way by which the object of the condemnation proceed-
ings could be accomplished"-had not been demonstrated."' 1
These requirements ensure adequate protection of the pre-existing
use while enabling the courts to approve the taking if the condemnor
has proven the requisite need. The stringency of the "paramount im-
portance" test admits enough flexibility to respond to social exigency,
yet allays the "occupation" misgivings about the broader "more neces-
sary use" test, poignantly expressed by one judge in the context of a
county-village conflict:
This doctrine I cannot agree with, for without legisla-
tive sanction, and by pure judicial decree, such doctrine
would, more often than not, permit an expanding political
subdivision, with great planning and financial resources, to
plunder the small political subdivision, without such re-
sources, but which wanted to do for its residents as it saw
best . 162
It also addresses the prevailing judicial rationalization for the prior
public use doctrine-that it averts circular or recriminatory condemna-
tionsl'6 -because "[ojnce the determination of superior use is made, it
supplants the inferior leaving no ground for retaliation."'"
Given the controversy over the legitimacy of judicial implementa-
tion of a "more necessary use" test,'" the heightened standard ad-
vanced above should be embodied in a statutory authorization for courts
to determine whether a condemnor has made the requisite showing of
paramount importance.' 6 A determination of this magnitude should
160 See id. at 103.
161 Id.
1.2 Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Comm'rs, 112 Ohio App.
272, 287-88, 166 N.E.2d 143, 154 (1960) (Guernsey, J., dissenting in part), appeal
dismissed per curiam, 171 Ohio St. 449, 172 N.E.2d 133 (1961).
163 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
16 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Houma, 229 So. 2d 202, 212 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 254 La. 1165, 229 So. 2d 350 (1969).
185 See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
166 As the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated:
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court of Washington illustrate
the necessity of statutory authority to enable a court to determine, upon
the basis of the greater public benefit, the relative rights of competing con-
demnors. In City of Chehalis v. City of Centralia,. . .77 Wash. 673, 138
P. 293 (1914), the court applied the rule of first in time, first in right; but
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derive from a statutory directive rather than from a potentially strained
finding of legislative authorization of the acquisition by "necessary im-
plication. '1 6 7 One commentator has observed that the judicial function
of ensuring that the "best use" of the land prevails "should not be exer-
cised under the veil of statutory construction to determine the legislative
intent." ' To the extent that a legislature can resolve in advance the
question of which purposes constitute the more necessary use, these
conclusions should be embodied in the statute in the form of a hierar-
chy of certain designated uses. 69
D. The Nature of "Public Use" and the Character of the
Condemnor and Condemnee
The "occupation"-"social utility" accommodation principle also
furnishes guidance for judicial construction of the term "public use"
and judicial attribution of significance to the character of condemnor
and condemnee. These two themes in prior public use adjudication con-
verge when courts formalistically construe "public use" as erecting a
threshold requirement that the resisting land owner possess a power of
condemnation equivalent to that of the condemnor in order to be enti-
tled to invoke the prior public use doctrine. 170 In Texas Eastern Trans-
in State ex rel. Kennewick Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court for Walla Walla
County, 118 Wash. 517, 204 P. 1 (1922), the court decided in favor of the
condemnor who had proved that its condemnation of the property would
result in the greater public benefit. The statutes governing the condemna-
tion proceeding in Chehalis contained no provision authorizing the court
to weigh the public benefit; but when Kennewick was decided, the gov-
erning statutes had been amended so as to provide: "In condemnation pro-
ceedings the court shall determine what use will be for the greatest public
benefit, and that use shall be deemed a superior one."
Board of Supervisors v. Board of County Supervisors, 206 Va. 730, 735-36, 146 S.E.2d
234, 239 (1966).
17 See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
168 Note, Intergovernmental Conflicts, supra note 70, at 210.
169 See Dau, supra note 3, at 1525-26 ("This legislative determination of the pur-
poses fulfilling the requirement that the taking be for a more necessary public use
provides certainty in this area of the law . . . . It also seems more fitting to have the
legislature determine which uses shall be more necessary. . . ."). Although this Com-
ment questions the particular legislative determination at issue in People ex rel. Public
Utilities Commission v. City of Fresno, 254 Cal. App. 2d 76, 81-85, 62 Cal. Rptr. 79,
82-85 (1967) (construing a California statute that defines condemnation by the state or
any political subdivision as a "more necessary use" than any existing public use by a
private person or a corporation), that case involves an example of the type of statutory
provision discussed in the text.
1"0 See Board of Educ. v. Pace College, 27 A.D.2d 87, 89-91, 276 N.Y.S.2d 162,
164-66 (1966), motion denied, 19 N.Y.2d 672, 225 N.E.2d 554, 278 N.Y.S.2d 862
(1967); see also supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing Pace College);
supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the character
of the condemnor and the condemnee).
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mission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc.,1 71 the New Jersey Supreme
Court adhered to such a bright line requirement.1 2 In that case, a
pipeline and natural gas company sought to condemn, for installation of
an underground gas transmission pipeline, a right of way across the
land of a private, nonprofit corporation devoted to the conservation of
wildlife.' Even as the court espoused the formalistic approach, how-
ever, it implicitly acknowledged its limitations:
Defendant's voluntary consecration of its lands as a wildlife
preserve, while not giving it the cloak of a public utility, does
invest it with a special and unique status. Qualitatively, for
purposes of the present type of proceeding, the status might
be described as lower than that of a public utility but higher
than that of an ordinary owner who puts his land to conven-
tional use. Unquestionably, conservation of natural resources
can and would become a legitimate public purpose if en-
gaged in by a federal or state government or an authorized
agency thereof. . . . Under the circumstances, and although
plaintiff's right to condemn land in this area for the pipeline
is clear, we believe . . . that Wildlife Preserves is entitled to
have a plenary trial of its claim that a satisfactory alternate
route is available to plaintiff which will not result in such
irreparable damage to the preserve.'
As one of the attorneys for Wildlife Preserves has observed, "[tihis was
not dictum, but. . . it was not intended to have any practical applica-
tion.' 75 The jurisprudence advocated by this Comment, emphasizing
judicial cognizance of possessory rights and social value, corrects the
"double vision" that hindered the Wildlife Preserves court. The for-
malistic requirement that the condemnee and condemnor possess
equivalent powers of condemnation in order to trigger the prior public
use doctrine should be abandoned, because it serves neither of the pol-
icy justifications constituting the best rationale for the doctrine. Cases
in which the resisting land owner enjoys "special and unique status"
should be resolved in favor of applying the doctrine,76 modified, of
171 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966).
172 See id. at 267-68, 225 A.2d at 134.
171 See id. at 265-66, 225 A.2d at 132-33.
174 Id. at 268, 225 A.2d at 134.
'15 McCarter, supra note 34, at 1079. The pipeline was later built through the
wildlife refuge. See id. at 1076.
176 See id. at 1080 ("It can only be hoped that other jurisdictions will not adopt
the needlessly narrow construction of the prior public use defense-that it is unavaila-
ble unless a mutual power of eminent domain exists."). This jurisprudence would have
rendered the defense accessible to Pace College in its legal battle with the local board of
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course, by the paramount importance test outlined above.
Similarly, this jurisprudence does not align itself with courts that
attribute great significance to the character of the condemnor and con-
demnee when a municipal corporation seeks to condemn the facilities of
a public service corporation or an agent of the state seeks to condemn
land devoted to public use. Rather, it aligns itself with those courts and
opinions that attribute greater significance to possessory rightsY
When, for example, a municipality annexes territory encompassing a
public service corporation and wishes to condemn its facilities in order
to take over their operation, 1 8 this Comment contemplates no place for
the assumption of "municipal, ergo more necessary." Nor do general-
izations about the "low-grade" nature of public service corporations
and superiority of municipalities179 suffice to allow the taking. Rather,
on the facts of each case, a municipality must carry the burden of es-
tablishing paramount importance in order to overcome the protection
afforded by the prior public use doctrine: "To hold otherwise would
amount simply to the taking of property from one and destroying his
right to operate although expressly authorized to do so, and giving it to
another without any benefit to the public."18 As a certificate of public
convenience is indeed a property right, it is surely entitled to protection
by the courts. 81 Similarly, when a political subdivision seeks to con-
education. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. As indicated in the text, the
"possessory rights" tilt would not necessarily act alone in compelling accessibility of the
defense, but would often be reinforced by considerations of utility. As one judge put it:
I am loath to adopt the absolutist stand ... that in no case do we have
power to weigh the public benefit of the proposed use against the present
use of the property, merely because the condemnee lacks the power of
eminent domain. It is undisputed that we can and must do so if both con-
demnor and condemnee have the power of eminent domain....
. . . While in the instant case I agree that upon the facts the claim of
Pace College is subordinate to that of the local school board, I would be
unwilling to arrive at the same result were this taking to be of substantial
portions of college campuses actually in operation, so as to interfere with
such private colleges in our State as Vassar, Columbia, New York Univer-
sity, Cornell, or any of the other institutions of higher learning which are
so essential to the public needs of our State, and indeed of the nation.
Board of Educ. v. Pace College, 27 A.D.2d 87, 92, 276 N.Y.S.2d 162, 167 (1966)
(Benjamin, J., concurring in the result), motion denied, 19 N.Y.2d 672, 225 N.E.2d
554, 278 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1967).
177 See supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
19 See Duck River Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Manchester, 529 S.W.2d
202, 206 (Tenn. 1975) ("[These corporations] are manifestly low-grade, volunteer pub-
lic service type corporations, inferior in all respects, to municipalities which exist for
the purpose of general government.").
180 City of Pryor Creek v. Public Serv. Co., 536 P.2d 343, 346 (Okla. 1975).
181 See Town of Culpeper v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 215 Va. 189, 193-94,
207 S.E.2d 864, 867-68 (1974).
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demn the land of a public service corporation and put it to a different
use, there is no reason for "relaxing" the protection of the doctrine."8 2
Rather, a municipal corporation endowed with the power of eminent
domain stands no differently before the courts than a private corpora-
tion clothed with the same power. 8 Finally, the jurisprudence sug-
gested by this Comment does not sanction a futile judicial attempt to
divine whether the condemnor is acting on behalf of the sovereign in
order to determine whether the prior public use doctrine is operative.'"
Such elaborate jurisdictional gymnastics are far removed from both the
csocial utility" and "occupation" elements of prior public use
adjudication:
We cannot see any reason for implying an overriding prior-
ity on such a theory . . . . The public use of land by a pri-
vate utility for water, light, and communication might ap-
pear to many persons to be of as great, if not greater, public
concern and interest than that of some other governmental
uses which might be asked in the name of the sovereign
state.' 85
As another judge put it:
[I]t is begging the question . . . to say that the Highway
Department is the State. . . . The State legislature invested
the Highway Department with the power to take private
property for a public use by eminent domain . . . in the
same degree and only to the extent it did this railroad.
A reference to the legislative Acts which confer
upon the Department the right to take property . . . shows
that they simply delegated that power to the department
188
The approach to this issue adopted by the Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals in State v. City of Denton8 7 was a sound one. The state had
brought an action against the city on behalf of North Texas State Uni-
182 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
188 See Vermont Hydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 153, 112 A. 223, 227
(1921).
184 See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
15 Cemetery Co. v. Warren School Township, 236 Ind. 171, 186, 139 N.E.2d
538, 545 (1957).
188 Southern Ry. v. State Highway Dep't, 219 Ga. 435, 442-44, 134 S.E.2d 12,
17-18 (1963) (Duckworth, C.J., partially concurring in judgment, partially dissenting
in judgment, and dissenting in opinion).
187 542 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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versity to establish the right of the university to use certain public
streets for a recreation center."' 8 The state argued that the university
was an arm of the sovereign and therefore had the power to condemn
public property.18 The court reviewed the relevant statutes and con-
cluded that no statute had granted express authority to the university to
condemn the streets. 9 ° Without such authorization, the city's exclusive
dominion over the streets, granted by the state legislature, had not been
modified. 91 Indeed, "[t]here is no sound reason for holding state agen-
cies. . . to a different standard from political subdivisions and nongov-
ernmental bodies. The basic argument in favor of substantial review
when other than the legislature takes applies to all grantees of a gen-
eral power. ' '
CONCLUSION
It is the feature of substantial review that constitutes the core
value of the prior public use doctrine. When private property is con-
demned, judicial review is limited to monitoring for abuse of discretion,
but the context of prior public use implicates a much fuller, more active
judicial role. As the court in Township of Weehawken v. Erie Railroad
Co."93 stated:
It was argued below . . . that Weehawken, having the
power of condemnation to achieve the intended purpose, has
complete discretion in determining the quantity and location
of the property to be acquired, and the exercise thereof will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of the power. While this is
the judicial approach to the exercise of the eminent domain
power, it is not applicable where the doctrine of prior use
comes into play.
19 4
When the doctrine "comes into play," courts may exploit their fact-
finding expertise to determine whether the condemned property is be-
ing used; whether the use is a public use; whether the proposed and
pre-existing uses are compatible; and whether the proposed use is a
more necessary use. If courts adopt a "judicial approach" to the "toils"
I" See id. at 225.
18 See id.
190 See id. at 229.
191 See id.
192 Note, Intergovernmental Conflicts, supra note 70, at 210; see also supra note
104 and accompanying text (discussing whether the prior public use doctrine should
apply when the state delegates to an agent its power of eminent domain).
293 20 N.J. 572, 120 A.2d 593 (1956).
I" Id. at 584-85, 120 A.2d at 599 (citations omitted).
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of prior public use litigation that mobilizes their competence to respond
to both the "social utility" and "occupation" dimensions of the prob-
lem, this principle will reconcile the discrepancies in application of the
prior public use doctrine.
